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The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction seeks 
inter alia to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of parental child 
abductions and ‘to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their 
habitual residence’ (Preamble) [emphasis added]. Accordingly, save in exceptional cir-
cumstances (see Arts. 12(2), 13 and 20), an abducted child shall be returned ‘forthwith’ 
(Art. 12(1)). The return order is intended to reinstate the status quo that existed before 
the abduction (Explanatory Report to the 1980 Convention, para. 18 (hereafter: 
‘Explanatory Report’)) and enable any determination of the merits of the custody rights 
to take place ‘before the competent authorities in the State where the child had its habitual 
residence prior to its removal’ (Perez-Vera, 1981, para. 19). In Re B (A Child) (Abduction: 
Habitual Residence) [2020] EWCA Civ 1187, the Court of Appeal (consisting of Moylan, 
Baker and Phillips LJJ) was faced with the question whether, on the facts of the case, the 
trial judge interpreted the concept of habitual residence appropriately and arrived at 
a correct finding as to where the child was habitually resident prior to the abduction. 
Importantly, Moylan LJ also expressed an obiter view on whether there is power under 
the Convention to order the ‘return’ of the child to a Contracting State other than the one 
where the child was habitually resident immediately before the abduction (‘‘‘return” to 
a third state’). The focus of this case comment is on the obiter point.
The case concerned a two-year old child, B, born in Australia. Her mother and father 
were born in England and France respectively. They met in Australia in 2015, after 
having moved to live there in 2007 and 2014 respectively. The parents married in 2017. In 
2019, the family relocated to France, arriving in that country on 2 December. On 
20 December, they travelled to England to spend the Christmas holidays with the 
mother’s family. The father returned to France on 27 December due to work commit-
ments. In early January 2020, the mother informed the father that she and the child 
would not be coming back to France. The father applied for the return of the child to 
France under the 1980 Hague Convention. At the first instance, his application was 
dismissed as the judge (Judd J) decided that, at the date of the retention of the child by the 
mother in England, the child was habitually resident in Australia rather than France. 
Consequently, the 1980 Convention did not apply as the court did not have power to 
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order the return of the child to a third state. The father appealed. On appeal, the decision 
of Judd J was reversed as the child was found to be habitually resident in France.
Examining the question of whether a return order can only require a child to be 
returned to the state of their habitual residence at the date of the abduction or whether 
the 1980 Convention permits a court to order that a child be ‘returned’ to a third state, 
Moylan LJ engaged with a number of considerations. These led him to conclude that 
there was power under the Convention to order that a child be ‘returned’ to a third state 
(para. 104).
In particular, His Lordship considered that the Convention was to be interpreted 
purposively (para. 105). On this point, he cited Lady Hale in the case of In re K (A Child) 
(Reunite International Child Abduction Centre Intervening [2014] UKSC 29 (which 
concerned the matter of ‘inchoate custody rights’). Paradoxically, he quoted inter alia 
her words that one of the purposes of the 1980 Convention that she considered relevant 
was to ‘enable the courts of the child’s habitual residence to determine where his long 
term future should lie’ (para. 105). Given His Lordship’s findings on the matter of 
a ‘return’ to a third state, this quote is rather inconsistent.
Moylan LJ also compared the wording of the Preamble to the 1980 Convention and 
the Explanatory Report to the Convention and found a discrepancy between the two. In 
particular, the Preamble refers to the prompt return of abducted children to the State of 
their habitual residence as one of the key objectives of the Convention [emphasis added]. 
In contrast, para. 110 of the Explanatory Report explains that the matter of a ‘return’ to 
a third state was expressly considered by the drafters of the Convention and that ‘[t]he 
Convention’s silence on this matter must [. . .] be understood as allowing the authorities 
of the state of refuge to return the child directly to the applicant, regardless of the latter’s 
present place of residence’. His Lordship was persuaded by this passage as he concluded, 
inter alia, that the Explanatory Report ‘makes clear that an express decision was made to 
leave scope for return to a return state’ (para. 111) and that ‘to interpret the Convention 
otherwise would be inconsistent with the objective of protecting children from the 
harmful effects of international child abduction’ (para. 116).
Baker and Phillips LJJ refrained from expressing a view on the matter as it would have 
been ‘entirely obiter’ (para. 136). Rather, their Lordships preferred to wait ‘until the issue 
falls for substantive determination’ (para. 136).
With respect, the conclusion reached by Moylan LJ is at odds not only with the 
wording of the Convention itself (Preamble, see above), which, it is submitted here, 
should be accorded greater weight that the Explanatory Report, but also with another 
provision of the Explanatory Report itself. Namely, paragraph 19 of the Explanatory 
Report states: ‘[t]he Convention rests implicitly upon the principle that any debate on the 
merits of the question, i.e. of custody rights, should take place before the competent 
authorities in the State where the child had its habitual residence prior to its removal’ 
[emphasis added]. This provision also supports the argument that the 1980 Convention 
has to be applied as part of a broader regulatory framework applicable in the area of 
international family law, in particular instruments that set out rules on jurisdiction for 
substantive custody proceedings. Such relevant instruments are the 1996 Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co- 
operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of 
Children (hereafter: ‘the 1996 Convention’), and the Council Regulation (EC) No 
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2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental respon-
sibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (hereafter: ‘the Brussels IIa 
Regulation’). Both the 1996 Convention and the Brussels IIa Regulation state that, in 
matters of parental responsibility, jurisdiction to deal with the substance of a matter is 
vested with the courts of the state of the child’s habitual residence (Arts. 5 and 8 
respectively). The state of the child’s habitual residence is regarded as the most appro-
priate forum given its proximity to the child and, consequently, likely availability of 
relevant evidence. The 1996 Convention and the Brussels IIa Regulation also provide that 
the state of habitual residence retains jurisdiction after an abduction until specific 
requirements have been met (Arts. 7 and 10 respectively). Consequently, ‘returning’ 
a child to a third state could mean that ‘that state had no substantive jurisdiction to make 
welfare decisions’ (para. 45). Not less importantly, such ‘return’ order could be seen as 
effectively amounting to a relocation decision reached without attendant welfare inquiry 
(cf para. 117). Such orders need to be avoided. Indeed, as was submitted on behalf of the 
mother, ‘the word “return” means return and not relocation to a third state’ (para. 41).
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